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Lobbying the European Parliament: Identifying Changing
Trends Post-Treaty of Lisbon

Jason Means1
Dr. Birol Yeşilada, Thesis Adviser

Abstract

This study evaluates the assumption that lobbying at the EP level steadily
increased after the Treaty of Lisbon, and also the expectation that there would
be no variation in lobbying activity (measured by types of lobbyists) during this
period. Research was conducted through the utilization of data from the
European Transparency Register as scraped by Friedrich Lindenberg between
2012 and 2014. After categorizing more than 16,000 entries it was determined
that the amount of lobbyists targeting the EU has steadily increased, and the
primary lobbying group between the researched period was Business—though,
there was a significant amount of variation between the types of lobbying
groups, with NGOs coming in second. This is indicative of citizens becoming
more involved in EU affairs as the deepening of integration and the expansion
of supranational authority continues to affect ordinary Europeans.

1. Introduction
Several scholars have noted the absence of literature on EU lobbying, and the
majority of research to date has focused on the role of interest groups lobbying the
European Commission before 2009. After the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon,
researchers from several disciplines noted the likelihood of increased lobbying of the
European Parliament (EP), observing a shift in competencies and the increased role
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of the Parliament in the EU’s legislative process. Though, problems of transparency
and access have hindered the comprehensive, longitudinal data needed to quantify
the Treaty of Lisbon’s true effects on lobbying the EP.2 With regard to Brandsma
(2013)3, Hauser (2011)4, and Cirone (2011)5, this paper seeks to explore the reasons
why interest groups would be more likely to lobby the European Parliament after the
Treaty of Lisbon, identify whether an increase has actually occurred, and then gauge
which interest groups have chosen to lobby the EP. As the term lobbying is frequently
used throughout this paper, it is important to clarify how it will be used within the
framework of this study: Lobbying refers to the influencing of legislative or
administrative decisions made by public officials through the use of interest group
representatives.6
Section 2 will provide a historical overview of the changing structure of the
European Parliament in order to provide a contextual background necessary in
understanding the reasons behind the EP’s post-Lisbon makeup.
Section 3 will critically review the theories of the aforementioned scholars in
determining the potential reasons why an interest group would be more likely to
Henry Hauser, “European Union Lobbying Post-Lisbon,” in Berkeley Journal of
International Law, vol. 29, 2011, 697
2

Gijs Jan Brandsma, “Bending The Rules: Arrangements for Sharing Technical and
Political Information between the EU Institutions,” in European Integration online Papers
(EloP), vol. 17 (Special Issue 1), 1-22
3

4

Ibid.

Alexandra Cirone, “Patterns of Interest Group Lobbying at the EU,” Columbia University,
2011, 1-27
5

Peter Koeppl, The Acceptance, Relevance and Dominance of Lobbying in the EU
Commission (London: Henry Stewart Publications, 2001), in Hauser, 682
6
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target the European Parliament when choosing which EU institution to lobby. The
Treaty of Lisbon has brought many changes to the EU’s institutional structure,
including an increased demand for access to technical information, causing MEPs to
rely on lobbyist support.7 On the lobbyist’s side of the table, targeting the EP has been
posited to be more efficient and cost-effective due to the use of party groups as
information shortcuts.8
The perceived benefits of targeting the EP contains a sense of dissonance when
considering traditional views on EU lobbying. Past literature has noted the tendency
for interest groups to target the European Commission in an attempt to shift EU
policy, considering that the Commission is the only European institution with the
right to initiate legislation. 9 Regardless, it is apparent that the EP has become a
viable venue for lobbyists.10 The EP is considered to be especially favorable for those
representing NGOs and other groups that champion public interest issues—MEPs,
as directly elected representatives of the European public, are very invested in topics
of relevance to their constituents.11
In considering the complex inter-institutional relationships of the European
Union, technical information is not the only important type of knowledge required to

7

Hauser, 698; Brandsma, 4

Hauser, 703; Léa Roger and Thomas Winzen, “Party Groups and Committee Negotiations
in the European Parliament: Outside Attention and the Anticipation of Plenary Conflict,” in
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 22, Issue 3, 2015, 391-408
8

9

Cirone, 2 and 5

10

Ibid., 2

11

Cirone, 7
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navigate the legislative arena. Brandsma argues that both technical and political
information are imperative and dictate the strategy institutions adopt in order to
push legislation forward.12 He even argues that political information is the subject of
most, if not all, inter-institutional arrangements, which indicates that MEPs most
rely on interest groups for their technical information. What is uncertain, however,
is whether this reliance on lobbying truly affects the legislative process—the
European Parliament is but one arm of the European Union’s legislative body.
Section 4 will provide a detailed explanation of the methods utilized in
determining whether lobbyists have increasingly targeted the EP since the
ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. Though data was unavailable immediately
following 2009, thanks to Friedrich Lindenberg and the joint LobbyFacts project at
the Corporate Europe Observatory and LobbyControl, this study has utilized data on
persons accredited to lobby the EP from 2012 to 2014.
Afterwards, the aforementioned data will be analyzed to determine a) whether
there has indeed been an increase of individuals lobbying the European Parliament
since the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon and b) which organizations have chosen
to do so.13 The remainder of the paper will re-visit the framework through which this
study has been conducted in order to glean potential explanations for these changing
trends within the EU.

12

Brandsma, 5

Previous data suggests that NGOs and other groups representing the public interest have
chosen to target the European Parliament over the Commission, therefore this study will
check whether this is still the case. See Cirone (2011).
13
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2. Background
“The existence of a parliament does not by itself create a stronger bond between the
public and politics. To fulfil its mediating function, a parliament must establish a
meaningful relationship with both the people and the government.”14
The European Parliament was first established in 1952 as the Common
Assembly (CA) and belonged to the EU’s nascent form, The European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC).15 The CA was initially criticized as being nothing more than a
“democratic window-dresser and talking shop” due to its inability to influence the
policy-making process. 16 However, its creation was of importance to the founding
member states—the High Authority (HA; executive) of the ECSC was unelected,
consequently creating a democratic deficit. In a domestic context, the rational
response to such a deficit would be to legitimize executive authority through the
creation of a representative parliamentary assembly—all of the ECSC’s founding
states were parliamentary democracies—however, this was the first time that such a
feat had been attempted on a supranational scale.17 Member states were conflicted
on what form this body would take: German representatives preferred a federalist
approach—i.e., a strong parliament with real legislative and budgetary powers;
French representatives were somewhat skeptical of federalism and preferred (at

Luuk Van Middelaar, The Passage to Europe: How a Continent Became a Union (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 275
14

Michelle Cini and Nieves Borragan, European Union Politics (Oxford University Press,
2013), 161
15

Berthold Rittberger, Building Europe’s Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond
the Nation-State (Oxford University Press, 2005), 74
16

17

Ibid., 98
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least, initially) a largely unconstrained HA; Representatives from the Benelux states
argued that a parliamentary assembly would be incapable of defending certain
aspects of national sovereignty.18 It was concluded that the CA would be granted the
ability to dismiss the HA and its 78 members would be appointed from national
parliaments (thereby providing an indirect yet democratic link between ordinary
citizens and European elites).19 Though seemingly minuscule, this first acquisition of
power set the stage for the CA to seek out and successfully obtain more influence on
the basis of strengthening the EU’s legitimacy.
As illustrated by Table A (see below), in its 64 years of existence the European
Parliament has transitioned from having little authority to being on par with its
fellow institutions, having acquired more rights and responsibilities with every
treaty. Most noteworthy are the EP’s legislative and budgetary powers. As a function
of Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), the EP (with the Council) maintains
legislative authority over more than 80 policy areas. 20 This has allowed for more
inclusion of human rights issues in European affairs, given that the EP is subject to
public scrutiny and is therefore tasked with representing ordinary citizens—it has
amended legislation to improve standards on air and water quality, increased

18

Ibid., 100-101

19

Cini and Borragan, 160-161

20

Ibid., 163
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consumer protection, and has championed initiatives that promote the fair treatment
of workers.21
Table A: Critical Junctures in EP History22
Year

Event

Parliamentary Powers

1952

Common Assembly
Created

Right to dismiss High Authority

1970;
1975

Luxembourg Treaty;
Treaty of Brussels

Limited right to amend and approve community budget;
right to reject community budget

1979

First Direct Elections

MEPs transitioned from national parliamentarians to
separately elected officials

1987

Single European Act
(SEA)

Cooperation with Council in legislative affairs

1993

Treaty of Maastricht

Granted the right of Co-Decision; Right to approve or
reject Commission nominations

1999

Treaty of Amsterdam

Increased rights within Co-Decision; Right to formally
veto Commission President nomination

2003

Treaty of Nice

Extended rights within Co-Decision

Treaty of Lisbon

Granted equal budgetary status with the Council;
Granted equal legislative status with the Council (CoDecision transition to Ordinary Legislative Procedure
(OLP); Right to request treaty changes; (Contested) right
to elect Commission President

2009

Before the Treaty of Lisbon, there was a distinction between the EU’s
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure; the EP could only amend the latter,
thereby limiting the scope of its influence. Now that this distinction has been
repealed, the EP enjoys full access to the EU’s budget, and, in tandem with the

21

Ibid., 164

22

Table inspired by Cini and Borragan, 161
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Council, has the ability to amend the budget across all areas within the budgetary
realm.23
Further changes brought upon by the Treaty of Lisbon have created additional
avenues for citizens to engage with both the EP and the Commission: The EP has
instantiated its power and relevance by tying in Commission presidential candidates
with parliamentary elections—the adoption of Spitzenkandidaten helped to further
politicize the Commission in an attempt to convince voters that the EP’s electoral
process was more meaningful than ever before.24
This attempt, however, appears to have been in vain. The difference in voter
turnout between 2009 and 2014 was less than 1%, continuing the narrative of more
power, less interest. 25 Despite these failed attempts at cultivating democratic
legitimacy, the European Parliament has indeed made significant power gains since
its creation, and is therefore likely to be more of a target for interest groups.

3. Theoretical Framework
The previous section establishes that the EP has achieved significant power
gains since its creation, but how does this equate to an increase in being targeted by

23

Hauser, 9

“Spitzenkandidaten: the story of what made last year’s European elections different,”
European Parliament, last modified June 4, 2015,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150526STO59409/Spitzenkandidatenthe-story-of-what-made-last-year's-EP-elections-different
24

“Results of the 2014 European elections,” European Parliament,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html
25
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lobbyists? This section will explore past literature on the EP and lobbying as a means
to set the stage for this paper’s key hypotheses.

3.1 Information as Power

Brandsma identifies information as a key factor in determining whether
legislative initiatives are successful. 26 Drawing from Sabatier (1978), Brandsma
divides information into two categories: technical and political.

27

Technical

information is expertise based on empirical knowledge, and can be used in assessing
the costs and benefits of a particular legislative initiative with regards to its content.
Brandsma further divides technical information into two subcategories: exogenous
and endogenous expertise.28 Exogenous expertise refers to the technical information
already known to an individual or group before working on a certain policy, while
endogenous expertise refers to technical information that is learned on the job. 29
Whereas technical information focuses on content, political information is centered
on power and interests—specifically, information about other actors’ policy
preferences.

26

3031

Both forms of information are important to all of the EU’s

3

P. Sabatier, The Acquisition and Utilization of Technical Information by Administrative
Agencies (Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 23, 1978) in Brandsma, 4
27

28

Ibid., 4

Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion (Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, vol. 18, issue 2, 2002), 536-555, in Brandsma 4
29

30

Ibid., 4

Brandsma uses the amount of resources spent on obtaining information about a
particular policy as an indicator of the amount of interest an institution has.
31
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institutions, considering that technical information is imperative in creating sound
policies and political information is key to “winning” favorable policies throughout
the legislative process. 32 Brandsma finds that most formal and informal interinstitutional relationships are built on the acquisition of political information, and
that the EP is the primary benefactor of these relationships33, subsequently leaving
the need for technical information—specifically exogenous expertise—unsatisfied.

3.2 Supply and Demand: Interest Groups and the European Parliament

Exogenous expertise is particularly important to the EP due to the immense
expansion of its competencies brought upon by the Treaty of Lisbon. As previously
mentioned, the EP now acts as a bicameral legislator and has access to over 80 policy
areas. This has effectively “exacerbated the strain on its institutional resources” and
“[compelled] policymakers to rely more heavily on lobbyists for technical information
and representative input.”

34

Put simply, the expansion of the Parliament’s

competencies has created a demand for more technical information and a subsequent
supply of lobbyists to provide that information. Though Hauser’s primary focus was
on the Council, this paper operates under the assumption that his theories of supply
and demand in a European context readily apply to the European Parliament when
combined with Ringe’s theory of perceived preference coherence.

32

Ibid., 5

33

Ibid., 19

34

Hauser, 681
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Hauser’s focus on the Council stems from the Treaty of Lisbon’s extension of
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to many new policy areas and the introduction of
double majority voting. 35 He predicted that the newest Treaty would provide
businesses with fewer lobbying expenses and greater access to legislators:
“the expansion of QMV under Lisbon may increase the utility a business expects
to gain by spending an additional dollar on lobbying by enabling firms to obtain
favorable regulations despite securing less access to EU policymakers.”36
Similar logic can be applied to the EP when the extension of QMV is replaced with
the tendency of MEPs to compensate for their lack of exogenous information by
adopting the policy preferences of their party colleagues (i.e., perceived preference
coherence).37 In fact, it is perhaps more effective to focus on the EP instead of the
Council in this sense as the Council is made up of national representatives and is
therefore often not the chosen venue for lobbyists.38 In a traditional parliamentary
system, especially one that utilizes a closed-list PR electoral system, MPs adhere to
their party’s platform due to strong party leadership, however, MEPs are not in
danger of the usual sanctions (e.g. barring an MEP from reelection) because EP
candidate lists are chosen by national party delegations.39 Instead, party cohesion is
created by the positive benefits associated with the sharing of information between

35

Hauser, 688

36

Ibid., 703

Nils Ringe, “Perceived Preference Coherence in Legislative Politics,” in Who Decides, and
How? (Oxford University Press, 2010), 25-44
37

38

Cini and Borragan, 185

39

Ibid., 5
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MEPs. This can make up for the lack of technical information prevalent throughout
the European Parliament and also streamline the legislative process.
Perceived preference coherence is significant for lobbying, because, similar to
Hauser’s QMV-Council prediction, the technical information that lobbyists provide
has a greater chance of reaching more MEPs at less cost to interest groups. When
MEPs receive exogenous information that is particularly helpful in assessing whether
a particular policy matches their political preferences, according to Ringe these MEPs
are likely to share this information with their colleagues; thus, this utility creates an
incentive for interest groups to focus on lobbying the European Parliament.

3.3 Europeans and their Parliament

As EU integration further deepens to include issues that affect all Europeans,
it is unsurprising that there are now several examples of citizens’ organizations
getting involved in European affairs. In addition to the Parliament’s attempts at
engaging citizens, the Commission has created an avenue for ordinary Europeans to
get involved—The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). Beginning in April 2012, the
ECI provides a legal avenue for European citizens to mobilize in order to convince the
Commission to initiate particular legislation.

40

For a proposal to reach the

Commission, it must receive one million signatures from at least one quarter of EU
Member States. Then, by law, the Commission must decide whether it will act, and

Birol Ali Yesilada. "Public Opinion and Participation in the European Union: EUSA
Interest Section Papers.pdf" European Union Studies Association (2016), 5
40
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then explain the reasons behind said decision.41 At the time of this paper there are
currently four open initiatives: “Mum, Dad & Kids - European Citizens' Initiative to
protect Marriage and Family,” “Wake up Europe! Taking action to safeguard the
European democratic project,” “Stop Plastic in the Sea,” and “Fair Transport
Europe.” 42 While the ECI is not directly involved with the EP, it is nevertheless
indicative of an increasingly engaged Europe. This is but one example of how citizens
are increasingly transcending their involvement in domestic affairs to that of the
supranational level. Perhaps because of this, Cirone’s research indicates that NGOs
were more likely to lobby the Commission43. However, it is logical to assume that the
number of NGOs and other groups championing citizens’ interests will increasingly
target the European Parliament. With respect to Dur and de Bievre (2007) and
Beyers (2008), Cirone herself cites that NGOs provide technical information about
broad topics and issues that appeal to citizens, subsequently making them directly
relevant to MEPs.44 With this in mind, it seems likely that, at the very least, the rate
by which NGOs lobby the EP will increase.

41

Ibid.

“Open Initiatives,” last modified April 15, 2016, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/open
42

43

Cirone, 15

44

Cirone, 7
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3.4 Predictions

Utilizing the aforementioned theories and assumptions, it appears that the
expansion of powers granted to the EP by the Treaty of Lisbon has given interest
groups more reasons to lobby the EP and the EP more reasons to seek out lobbyists,
thus creating a relatively reciprocal relationship. Subsequently, MEPs’ need for more
technical information provides a logical explanation for a potential increase of
lobbyists within the halls of Parliament. Additionally, these groups seem likely to be
comprised of more NGOs and other groups representing citizens’ interests, as the EP
is the only institution comprised of directly elected representatives and is therefore
interested in maintaining access to issues that are relevant to public opinion.
Therefore, this study operates on the following hypotheses: H1: As EU integration has
deepened with each successive Treaty, lobbying at the EP is expected to steadily
increase after 2009. H0: No significant variation in lobbying activity (measured by
types of lobbyists) is expected as a result of the deepening of integration in the EU.

4. Methods
Though there is currently a public register that displays those with
accreditation to lobby the European Parliament, it lacks historical data and is mired
by those also registered with the European Commission. In order to perform a crosssectional study, I relied on data collected by Friedrich Lindenberg (@pudo) who,
among other projects, has devoted his resources towards data scraping the European
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Parliament Transparency Register daily from 2012 to 2014.45 Lindenberg’s data is
currently

being

used

by

two

transparency

projects,

the

open

source

http://openinterests.eu and http://lobbyfacts.eu, a joint endeavor of Corporate Europe
Observatory and LobbyControl.
I observed five datasets in total, covering 16,339 entries. Each dataset included
information on those registered on a particular day to lobby the European
Parliament. The five chosen datasets covered six month intervals, starting on March
16, 2012 and ending on March 16, 2014. The focal point of each entry was the
organization that the registered lobbyist represented—I coded each entry by cross
referencing the organization with categories assigned by LobbyFacts and
OpenInterests, and triple-checked the data by ascertaining an organization’s legal
status on their website when necessary. The data was categorized in five different
ways: Business, Professional Consultancy, Non-Governmental Organization (NGO),
Research Institution, and Government Organization.
Organizations were categorized as Business if they represented the interests
of a particular sector (e.g. Trade, Agriculture, Finance, etc.) and/or maintained a legal
status indicative of a business.46 A tangible example of an organization coded as a
business is “RENAULT,” a trucking company. Organizations that were labeled by
LobbyFacts and/or OpenInterests as NGOs or Professional Consultancies were coded

45

This data is accessible on Lindenberg’s website: data.pudo.com/eu

Dependent upon legal requirements in particular countries, for example, a Limited
Liability Company (LLC) is a Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) in Germany.
46
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as such, respectively.47 Separating professional consultancies from businesses was an
important distinction to make; as consultancies tend to represent multiple
individuals or organizations in their lobbying efforts it is impossible to categorize
them as anything else. Any organization that was labeled as representing “local,
regional and municipal authorities, other public or mixed entities, etc.”48 was coded
as Government Organization. Any organization devoted to research (e.g. universities,
think tanks, other research institutions, etc.) was coded as Research Organization.49
After coding was completed, all five datasets were tallied by their individual
categories and displayed to show the changing trends in the amount and type of
lobbyists with EP accreditation from 2012-2014. In order to adequately assess
whether H1 is correct, data on the amount of EP-accredited lobbyists from before or
immediately after the Treaty of Lisbon needed to be used. Cirone’s research
determined that in 2010 this number was approximately 1,880.50

5. Results and Analysis
There was an increase in the number of individuals with accreditation to lobby
the European Parliament between 2012 and 2014 (See Fig. A). After a jump of 1,002
registrations between March and September of 2012, the number of registrations

47

Additionally, religious organizations were coded as NGOs.

48

Particular wording used by LobbyFacts and OpenInterests

The initial study was designed to code the fifth data category as Think Tank, however it
quickly became apparent that there were more research-oriented organizations that were
not solely think tanks.
49

50

Cirone, 14
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increased every six months by an average of 11.2 percent. The slight curve between
September 2012 and March 2014 indicates more-than-average growth rates, though
without further data it is impossible to assess whether it can be called exponential
growth (Though it would seem spurious to claim that the relationship between Time
as an independent variable and the Number of Accredited Lobbyists as a dependent
variable is statistically significant).

When separating the total number of interest group representatives into
categories, it is clear that businesses represented the majority of groups lobbying the
EP (See Fig. B) between 2012 and 2014. NGOs came in second place, ahead of
professional consultancies, which may surprise the reader considering Cirone’s
previous claims. Though, the average gap between the amount of NGOs and
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businesses in this sample is 940. Noticeable in both Fig. A and Fig. B is the abrupt
increase of the slope between March 16th and September 16th in 2012—this is due to
a jump in registrations by those representing business interests. There is no
immediately identifiable event in early September 2012 to explain such an event,
nevertheless, a jump breaking the otherwise consistent slope occurred. Professional
Consultancy came in third, closely behind NGOs, and Research Organization and
Government Organization barely registered on the chart, fluctuating between fourth
and fifth at an average of 94 and 81 registered lobbyists, respectively. Occasionally it
was impossible to categorize an organization due to a multitude of reasons, ranging
from not being included in the LobbyFacts and OpenInterests databases to an
organization being extremely ambiguous about the nature of their legal status. These
numbers were comparatively low, however, never exceeding .008% of a total sample.

FIGURE B: INTEREST GROUP REPRESENTATIVES WITH
OFFICIAL EP PASSES BY TYPE (2012-2014)
Business
2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

3/16/12

Professional Consultancy
9/16/12

NGO
3/16/13

Research Organization
9/16/13

Government Organization
3/16/14
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These results illustrate that H1 is correct; Cirone’s record of 1,880 individuals
registered to lobby the EP had increased to 4,287 by March 16, 2014. Regarding H0,
there is large variation in the amount each group has chosen to lobby the European
Parliament: s2 for the above figure is more than 10 times that of x. It also appears
that the rate by which each group has increased between 2012 and 2014 varies:
Government Organization and Think Tank barely increased; Professional
Consultancy’s growth slowed to roughly half its original rate after March 16, 2013;
NGO dropped from 45% growth to 13% growth in the first year, but slowly increased
to 27% growth in the final sample; and Business, aside from the aforementioned
jump, maintained an almost consistent growth rate to match that of the total number
of registered lobbyists (in the months between the last two samples, the number of
registered lobbyists representing businesses grew by 12.8%). Therefore, we may
reject the null hypothesis that there was no significant variation in lobbying activity
(measured by types of lobbyists)—there was significant variation, which may be the
result of the deepening of integration in the EU.
It is unsurprising that Business was (and is likely to still be) the primary group
lobbying Parliament. Even at its inception, economic integration across Member
states has been more palatable than political integration. It is, however, notable that
the rate at which business lobbied Parliament was barely affected by the global
economic crisis and subsequent Great Recession. This is likely due to the theories laid
out by Brandsma, Hauser, and their colleagues—large businesses have the capital to
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research topics of importance to themselves and MEPs (i.e. access to technical
information); vis-à-vis perceived preference coherence, this research may be passed
on to other MEPs with little to no added expense to businesses. These avenues may
also be adopted by NGOs, especially considering that they represent public interests
and are therefore integral to the European legislative process; nevertheless, NGOs
lobby on a smaller scale than businesses.

5. Limitations and Future Research
There were several limitations to this study, the first being that the data used
did not cover the period immediately after the Treaty of Lisbon. Though my results
do suggest that H1 is correct and H0 is incorrect, the data would be more robust if it
covered interest groups with EP passes in six month intervals beginning in 2010 and
ending more recently, ideally in 2016.
Additionally, though the way in which Business was classified generally
followed suit with Cirone’s methodological set up and the classifications used by
LobbyFacts and OpenInterests, it is ideologically questionable and may have skewed
the data. This is due to this study’s inclusion of interest groups representing trade

unions. Trade unions should not have been included in the Business category because
they aren’t inherently representing the interests of businesses—instead, they
represent the rights and interests of their particular constituencies, namely, workers.
It would be valuable to replicate the previous study while isolating trade unions as a
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separate control variable to assess whether the results would still place Business as
the primary group lobbying the EP.
Though this study’s results do indicate that NGOs are taking advantage of the
Parliament’s increased powers, these NGOs are greatly outnumbered by Business
interests; as the deepening of EU integration continues to affect ordinary citizens’
lives, though, it will be pertinent to identify whether NGOs will ever surpass
businesses in their future lobbying endeavors.

6. Conclusion
This study attempted to show the changing trends in lobbying within the
European Union, with particular focus on interest groups that have chosen to lobby
the European Parliament. By providing historical context, it was established that the
EP has experienced a significant growth in power and responsibility over the last 64
years, and as the solely elected body of the EU, MEPs are tasked to represent the
interests of their constituents. Afterwards, the theories of Brandsma, Hauser, Cirone,
and their colleagues were discussed in order to lay the groundwork for this study’s
hypothesis and null hypothesis—through coding more than 16,000 data entries
covering a period of two years, it was determined that the rate of lobbyists targeting
the EP has indeed increased and indicates continual growth; it was also determined
that there is a large amount of variation in the types of groups that choose to lobby
the EP. Though businesses are the overall lobbying “champions” in terms of sheer
numbers, it is logical to posit that the increasing number of NGOs involving
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themselves in EP lobbying is indicative of an ever-closer European Union. The Treaty
of Lisbon, as an answer to the call for more citizen involvement, has been yet another
step towards the idea of political union.
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